Computational Theory Of Mind: What Does It Consist Of?
There are different theoretical models that try to explain the functioning of the human mind One of them is the computational model or theory of mind, which uses the metaphor of the computer to support the idea that our cognitive system processes information in the same way that a computer does.
In this article we talk about the computational theory of mind, what other theoretical and philosophical frameworks it draws on, which are its most prominent authors, and what type of criticism it has received.
The computational theory of mind is part of cognitive psychology, which is responsible for the study of the functioning of human cognition; that is, how people elaborate, transform, encode, store, retrieve and use the information they receive from their environment.
Computationalism, proposed by Hilary Putnam in the 1960s, is situated within cognitive psychology and understands that the functional architecture of human cognition is close to how it is understood from information processing models and artificial intelligence.
The formal bases of the computational theory of mind are based, on the one hand, on mathematical formalism that conceived a discipline such as mathematics as the art of manipulating symbols based on formal rules; and on the other hand, in Alan Turing’s experiments, he implemented a mathematical model that consisted of an automaton capable of constructing any mathematical problem expressed through algorithms.
Computationalism also draws on the synthesis of two philosophical positions: intentional realism and physicalism The first postulates the existence of mental states and intrinsic intentionality as part of the natural order of things, as well as the propositional attitude or the way in which people behave with respect to said propositions; and physicalism assumes that everything that exists has a physical and material entity.
The computational model is based on a series of basic principles that can help us better understand how it works Let’s see what they are:
The works of Noam Chomsky
The computational model of the mind was initially based on the theoretical proposals of Noam Chomsky and his generative grammar, which is based on the idea that, along with the specific rules for constructing sentences specific to each language, there are some more rules. basic (innate and common to all languages) that explain the ease with which we learn language as children.
According to Chomsky, all sentences have a deep structure (which contains their meaning) and another surface structure (the way in which the sentence is presented, when expressed). The deep structure would be abstract and the superficial structure would make up the physical or material reality of the language.
Chomsky also distinguished between a person’s ability to associate sounds and meanings with certain unconscious and automatic rules, and linguistic performance, which refers to the way of interpreting and understanding a particular sentence or language.
With everything, The theories of the popular famous linguist served to underpin computational theory that Jerry Fodor developed and that we will see below.
Fodor’s computational theory of mind
The computational theory of mind postulates that the functioning of the human mind is similar to that which occurs in a computer, the brain being the hardware of the information processing system. This theory combines the explanation of how we reason and how mental states work, and is also known as the “representational theory of mind.”
According to the philosopher Jerry Fodor, one of the greatest exponents of the theory, the mental is intentional and can also be reduced to the physical. For this author, the human mind is similar to a digital computer; That is, a device that stores symbolic representations and manipulates them through a series of syntactic rules.
Thoughts would, therefore, be mental representations that, in turn, function as symbols of the “language of thought”; and mental processes or states would be causal sequences guided by the syntactic (and not semantic) properties of the symbols. Fodor also defended the existence of an innate private language, distinct from the rest of natural languages or human languages.
Internal language vs. natural
Private and innate language would be used to perform the calculations and computations that are at the basis of human behavior To explain its existence, Fodor uses a simile with the languages that a computer uses: the input language (input) and the output language (output), which are the ones we use to enter data and read those provided by the computer. lap; that is, the way the computer communicates with its environment.
These two input and output languages are contrasted with machine language, which is what the computer understands and with which it performs its calculations and operations. Between both languages there are so-called compiler programs, which act as mediators or translators between them.
For Fodor, people’s private language can be compared to machine language; Therefore, public languages or natural languages (Spanish, English, French, etc.) would be similar to computer programming languages. Well, this language of thought would be an internal language and prior to public or natural languages, just as occurs with machine language in a computer that must be installed prior to any input/output language.
Criticisms of the theory
Fodor’s ideas and computationalism in general have not been exempt from criticism in recent years Although the idea that mental states are intentional is accepted, what for some scientists is debatable is the fact that these representations are manipulated through calculations and computations.
Philosopher Daniel Dennett considers the computational theory of mind to be empirically implausible, because a brain that manipulates computational symbols does not seem entirely biological. However, he is a supporter of “neural determinism,” which implies assuming that neuronal activity is prior to “free” decisions and that consciousness is only an epiphenomenon that, at most, has the evolutionary function of serving as a control mechanism and supervision of the processes of adaptation to the environment.
On the other hand, the philosopher Patricia S. Churchland is also critical of computational postulates and considers that the emergence of the language of innate thought does not seem very sensitive to evolutionary considerations, since the system must operate with formal or syntactic rules to manipulate representations, and every aspect of a symbol’s meaning that affects psychological processing must be formally codified.
If the cognitive system works exclusively according to syntactic principles, it cannot have access to the contexts that, in natural language, serve to eliminate ambiguities in the different meanings of the term. Furthermore, if every mental state is to be understood as some form of storing or processing a sentence in the language of thought, people would need an infinite number of sentences stored in our minds.
In short, there remains a problem with the nature of intentionality that is not yet fully resolved despite computational theory’s attempts to show, through the mind/computer metaphor, that physical systems can arise from intentional states.
