Moral Realism: Bases And History Of This Philosophical Position
Moral realism is a philosophical position that defends the objective existence of moral facts That is, it maintains that, regardless of subjective, cognitive or social properties; moral premises and actions have an objectively verifiable reality.
The latter has generated long and complex philosophical discussions around questions such as the following: are there really true moral statements? Does honesty, for example, have an objective reality? What gives the quality of “true” to a moral statement? Is this a metaphysical debate or rather a semantic one? Likewise, and beyond philosophical debates, moral realism has been incorporated into important theories of psychological development.
In line with the above, we will see in an introductory way what moral realism is, what are the philosophical positions with which it debates and how it has been incorporated into psychology.
Moral realism is the philosophical position that affirms the objective existence of moral facts. According to Devitt (2004), for moral realism, there are moral statements that are objectively true, from which the following conclusion can be drawn: There are people and actions that are, in objective terms, morally good, bad, honest, unkind etc.
For its defenders, moral realism is an important part of the worldview of subjects in general, and it was so for the social sciences especially before the emergence of contemporary currents that questioned the relationship between “meaning” and “truth.”
He maintains, for example, that a person’s cruelty functions as an explanation for his behavior, which makes moral facts part of the hierarchy of facts that make up the natural world.
Some background
Realism, in more general terms, It is a philosophical position that maintains the objective existence (independent of the observer) of the facts of the world This means that our perception is a faithful representation of what we observe, and the same goes for when we speak: by stating something in literal terms, its existence and veracity are confirmed. That is to say, at the heart of this argument is the univocal relationship between language and meaning.
Beginning with the “linguistic turn” of the 20th century, philosophical debates and issues were discussed in relation to language and the relationship between the latter and meaning was questioned, thereby also questioning the most fundamental philosophical truths.
The latter has led different philosophers to discern between debates about the meaning we give to the world, and debates about things in the external world. That is, between metaphysical debates and semantic debates. Realism as a philosophical position can be observed in many different areas, for example, in philosophy of science, in epistemology, or, as in the case at hand, in morality.
Dimensions of moral realism
According to this philosophical position, Moral facts translate into psychological and social facts
There are, therefore, actions that “should” be carried out and others that should not, as well as a series of rights that can be awarded to the subjects. And all of this can be verified objectively, since they exist independently of the person or the social context that observes or defines them. For this reason, Devitt (2004) tells us that moral realism is sustained in two dimensions:
1. Independence
Moral reality is independent of the mind, since moral facts are objective (they are not shaped by our feelings, opinions, theories or social conventions).
2. Existence
It maintains a commitment to moral facts, since it affirms their objective existence.
Criticisms and debates around the objectivity of moral facts
Criticisms of moral realism have come from subjectivist and relativist currents that have questioned the relationship between language and the different elements that make up both psychological and social reality; as well as the possibility of talking about said reality independently of who defines or experiences it.
Specifically, in the context of moral realism and relativism, two main criticisms arise that are known as “non-cognitivism” and “error theories.” All of them debate around the same object of research: moral statements.
And they wonder, on the one hand, if these statements speak of moral facts, and on the other, if those facts or at least some of them are true. While moral realism would respond affirmatively to both questions, and would ask what makes a moral fact “true” in universal terms; non-cognitivism and error theories would respond in different ways.
Non-cognitivism
Non-cognitivism maintains that moral statements do not correspond to moral properties; in fact, they are not statements properly, but rather indicative sentences without a truth condition that corresponds to the facts.
They are sentences that express attitudes, emotions, prescribe norms, but not moral facts in themselves. This semantic analysis is accompanied by a metaphysical position that affirms that there are no moral properties or facts.
That is to say, non-cognitivists deny that moral statements refer to objective facts, and therefore, they also deny that these are true. In other words, they deny realist explanations about nature and moral reality, and they deny realist claims about the causal role of reality.
Error Theory
Broadly speaking, the Theory of Error, by the Australian philosopher (known for his moral skepticism) John Leslie Mackie, says that moral statements do contain moral meanings, but that none of them can be completely true. That is, there are moral facts that are reported through moral statements, but they are not necessarily true.
For the theory of error, there are no moral facts in themselves, that is, it denies the existence of any objective reality of morality. To analyze why people argue about moral facts that do not exist, someone who defends error theories could point out how moral statements are used to mobilize emotions, attitudes or personal interests (based on the fact that these discussions inform about facts). with moral meanings).
For his part, someone who defends non-cognitivism could analyze the same situation by referring to the practical usefulness of speaking as if moral statements truly intended to report facts, even though they really do not (starting from the idea of moral statements nor They don’t even pretend to report facts).
Moral realism in developmental psychology
Moral realism is also one of the key concepts in Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget’s theory of moral development.
Roughly, What it proposes is that children go through two major phases characterized by stages of progressively abstract reasoning These phases follow the same sequence in all children, regardless of their cultural context or any other element external to the subject himself. The phases are as follows:
Subsequently, the American psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg comes to the conclusion that moral maturity is not reached after the second stage proposed by Piaget. He elaborates his own scheme of moral development in six stages that include the first two of the Swiss psychologist, including the idea that morality has universal principles that cannot be acquired in early childhood.
What Kohlberg does is take Piaget’s theories of cognitive development towards more detailed studies on the evolution of moral judgments; understanding these as a reflective process on values, and from the possibility of ordering them in a logical hierarchy that allows facing different dilemmas.
The studies of Piaget and Kohlberg had a very important impact on developmental psychology; however, they have also received various criticisms precisely for appealing to a neutrality and universality of moral development that could be applied to understand all subjects regardless of issues such as context. cultural or gender.
