The Euthyphro Dilemma: What It Is And What It Says About Morality
Are things morally good because God has decided so or are they good because inherently they are and God is attracted to them?
The idea that morality depends on God is a widespread belief, especially in Christianity. This belief implies that moral facts could be otherwise, that God could decide that they stop being good and become negative things.
Euthyphro’s dilemma, although it dates back to Classical Greece, has served to destroy opinions in favor of the existence of God, calling into question his decision-making capacity and the very nature of morality. Let’s look at it further below.
The idea that morality depends on God is a widespread belief Within Christian theistic moralism, the idea that God is the source of morality is defended. He communicates to us mortals what is good and what is evil and since he is omnibenevolent and never makes a mistake, the good things said by him are undoubtedly good. Using his criteria, the morality that comes to us from him is what we on earth use to delimit what is right and should be done and what is wrong and should be punished.
Nevertheless, If he who decides if something is good, he himself can decide that it becomes bad at any time That is to say, if we consider that morality is based on God’s decisions, it means that it is not immutable, and this aspect that has been used since to attack positions in favor of the existence of God, especially throwing down the argument moralist to affirm its existence. This particular argument is the Euthyphro dilemma.
Basically this argument comes to question the omnipotence of God and, in turn, the nature of morality itself having to accept that either God is not capable of changing the most morally evident facts or God can act in a completely arbitrary manner, deciding what is right and what is wrong and being able to either err or behave capriciously.
Who was Euthyphro?
Euthyphro, who is known rather little about him, gives name to one of the most important dilemmas surrounding logical and philosophical discussions about the existence of God. Euthyphro is a character who appears in one of Plato’s dialogues that, although it was this philosopher who wrote it, the conversation is not with him but with Socrates. The story, called “Euthyphro” or “On Piety” belongs to a series called “First Dialogues”, the story taking place at the time of Meletus’ accusation against Socrates, just before he was sentenced to death by drinking hemlock in subsequent trials.
In the conversation between the two, the ideas of justice and mercy take center stage. Socrates is surprised by what Euthyphro plans to do, which is to accuse his father. Socrates asks him if he considers this action to be holy, this being the question that unleashes the entire dialogue and the dilemma that bears his name. Socrates asks him, “Is the holy loved by the gods because he is holy, or is he holy because he is loved by the gods?” After the dialogue has begun, everything is based on analyzing the response that both Euthyphro and Socrates issue and the implications that this entails.
The original Euthyphro dilemma consists of analyzing the very “substance” of the “holy” If what is holy is loved by the gods because it is holy, then the property “being holy” is not acquired by the gods’ decision, but holy things have this virtue by themselves. In this case, the love of the gods towards holy things does not add extra value since they already have it and will continue to have it whether the gods love them or not.
On the other hand, if things are holy because they are loved by the gods, then they need that love to be holy. That is to say, Depending on the preferences of the gods, objects, people and acts are holy In this case, it is the love of the gods that makes things holy.
Analyzing the dialogue we can see that both options cannot be valid, since by necessity one has to be correct: either holy things are holy because they are and therefore the gods prefer them or holy things are holy because they are. loved by the gods, thus acquiring the property of saints. Technically both options are opposite and one is forced to choose one of them and, consequently, each choice brings with it its own philosophical implication
The dilemma applied to Christianity
Once its original version is understood, we move on to see how the Euthyphro dilemma is applied today, especially as an argument against the claim that God exists. Within Christianity there is an entire monotheistic theory of morality that tries to explain that things are holy in relation to God
The theist who believes that God is a necessary being and possesses the classic qualities of deity (omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, omnibenevolent…) attributes all moral reality to him and bases everything that is good on him. God is the source of morality.
Starting from this idea, there are many Christians who defend that God exists because with his existence we can speak “objectively” about what is good and correct and differentiate it from what is bad and incorrect.
God has to exist out of necessity because, for example, killing innocent people is universally viewed as immoral. This view of this specific act as immoral would be proof that there is a God who guides us saying what is right and what is wrong, and how we should act.
And this is where the Euthyphro dilemma comes in, put forward by non-believers, both adopted to the vision of the Christian God and to Jehovah, Allah or the monotheistic deity that pertains, although instead of talking about “the holy” they go on to talk about “the good”. So, readapting the dilemma, the question would be “is something good because God says it is or God says it because it is good?” Both options are contrary and, as with its classic version, we have to choose one of them; Both cannot be affirmed as valid at the same time.
In some ways it is similar to the chicken and egg dilemma, only here we talk about morality and God and whether the first is a consequence or not of the second. Does the goodness of things exist by themselves or is it God who decides that this is how things are? If God decides, then can he decide that something moral becomes immoral? Is he omnibenevolent in case he changes his mind? If morality does not exist outside of God, can it really be said that everything “good” is good and everything bad is “bad”?
The Euthyphro dilemma has been widely used by non-believers as an argument to overthrow positions in favor of the existence of God, since with it, whether one chooses one or another of the options it proposes, one arrives at the same Conclusion: it cannot be demonstrated that God exists through morality to what extent God, supposedly omnipotent, decides whether things are good or bad or to what extent he has the full capacity to correctly decide what is right, being supposedly omnibenevolent.
Giving a more practical example to understand all this we just said. Let’s imagine that the moral argument has just been used to say that God exists, that is, morality is objective because it emanates from God himself. God must exist because thanks to him we know what is right and what is wrong. Then, to refute this someone talks about the Euthyphro dilemma, saying that 1) either things are good because God decides so or 2) good things attract God.
If we choose the first option it implies that objective morality does not exist, since it is not something that exists in nature itself but because God decides so. Thus the entire argument used for the existence of God would be falsified, indicating that we cannot be sure of his existence because this option implies affirming that morality is arbitrary.
If it is arbitrary, if there are things that can be good one day and bad another, then God is not omnibenevolent Because what reason would I have to change my mind? Isn’t what is right supposed to be right forever?
What happens if the second option is chosen? There remain problems with theistic moral theory. This option says that good things exist independently of God and that it is these things that dictate to God what his moral preferences should be. One could go so far as to say that these very things and their characteristics, in this second option, guide God in his existence in accordance with that which is good.
This second option implies that God is not the source of morality, and therefore good exists independently of him. As a consequence of this, the doctrine of God’s aseity, that is, being able to trust him, is tremendously affected, since not even he himself would know what is correct, he would have to receive it from the nature of things and we would have to trust that I would know how to see it.
God himself must submit to good, he does not decide what is right and what is wrong, which calls into question the concept of God as the highest authority in the universe. How is he going to be the Supreme Being if he does not decide what is right or wrong, but rather the properties of things? What is above it and how does it solve this problem?
The conclusions in both options involve concluding that God, whether he can decide what is moral or not, is neither omnipotent nor omnibenevolent and could not be trusted. If he can decide on moral aspects, he does so arbitrarily and, therefore, his judgment may not be the most accurate or the most benevolent. If he does not decide, then he does not have absolute power over nature, but rather it is nature that controls him and decides what he should do and what not.
Another option to this is that even God, even within his supposed omnipotence, cannot change absolutely everything, which in itself is a contradiction to this quality. As we have mentioned before, the idea of killing innocent people is wrong and our mentality, whatever it may be, does not conceive of the possibility that this could be right in any scenario. Therefore, even though he could change what is moral and transform it into immoral, there would be specific aspects like this one in particular that God could not alter. Killing innocent people is immoral naturally, without the intervention of God.
False dilemma?
However Christian theists themselves have been able to turn the tables on Euthyphro’s dilemma, or rather false dilemma. This exercise in philosophical-religious reflection would not have two apparently opposite options, but would actually have a third if applied within Christianity. As we said, the first option says that things are good because God decides so and, therefore, is the source of morality. The other option is that things are good and God is attracted to them. However, what the dilemma does not suggest is that both options could actually be correct.
In Christianity, God is the source of morality, but more than deciding what is right and what is not, it is he who emanates morality It is the source of morality in the sense that if it exists, morality must necessarily exist. In other words: the good is in God’s own existence. Good things would be inherently good as long as they were in accordance with the nature of God who, being omnibenevolent and source of morality, would be inherently good and moral as well and his decisions would never be wrong.
Thus, from this view, what happens is that God and morality exist simultaneously. Morality exists outside of God, it is not an arbitrary decision of his, but it is a consequence of his existence. God would not communicate to his believers what is good because he has found it out there, or because he has decided so, but because he has found those things that, as a consequence of his being, of his existence, correspond to what he it’s really nice.
