
See more of our articles in your search results.
A woman in her forties sits through a Monday team meeting with a pleasant, slightly glazed face, taking notes in tidy handwriting. She is competent, prepared and well liked. Forty minutes later, in the corridor, a colleague slams a door somewhere and something in her body goes off like a smoke alarm: breath gone, hands cold, a sudden certainty that she must be small and silent and out of sight. Ten minutes after that she is back at her desk, composed, and cannot quite say what just happened. She tells herself she is tired. She has told herself this for twenty years.
For people who have lived through severe or repeated trauma, this alternation between getting on with life and being yanked back into survival mode is common, and it confuses everyone, including the person living it. Clinicians have tried for more than a century to explain it. One of the most influential modern explanations is the theory of structural dissociation of the personality, developed by Onno van der Hart, Ellert R. S. Nijenhuis and Kathy Steele. It proposes that overwhelming trauma can divide the personality along natural fault lines, producing parts that handle daily life and parts that carry the trauma.
It is a theory, not a diagnosis, and a contested one.
This article explains Van der Hart’s theory of structural dissociation, what it is and what it explains, how it grew from older ideas, what evidence supports it, where it is criticized, and how it shapes treatment.
What is the theory of structural dissociation of the personality?
It is a model of how trauma can split the personality into separate, partly self-contained parts. In plain terms: when an experience overwhelms a person’s ability to hold their mental life together, the personality may divide into one or more parts that go on with ordinary life and one or more parts that stay fixed on the threat. The model is called the theory of structural dissociation of the personality (TSDP).
How many of these have you been "meaning to read" for months?
- 1
Oliver SacksThe Man Who Mistook His Wife for a HatUnforgettable clinical case studies on perception and identityListen Free On Audible - 2
Lori GottliebMaybe You Should Talk to SomeoneA bestselling memoir on the shared humanity of therapist and clientListen Free On Audible - 3
Irvin D. YalomLove's ExecutionerRadically honest case studies on existential dread and changeListen Free On Audible
The theory was set out most fully in the 2006 book The Haunted Self: Structural Dissociation and the Treatment of Chronic Traumatization, by Onno van der Hart, Ellert R. S. Nijenhuis and Kathy Steele. Van der Hart, a Dutch psychologist and historian of dissociation, did much to revive the work of the nineteenth-century French psychiatrist Pierre Janet; Nijenhuis, a psychologist and researcher, led much of the psychobiological research; and Steele, an American clinician, developed treatment approaches. The three combined more than sixty-five years of clinical and research experience, according to the book’s publisher.
The theory rests on a few core claims. The personality is not a single smooth thing but a system of psychobiological action systems, inborn sets of tendencies for dealing with particular situations: exploring, attaching, caring, playing, and, in danger, defending. Normally these systems are integrated, which means that a person can shift between them without losing a sense of being the same person. Trauma, especially when it is severe, early or repeated, can overwhelm the person’s integrative capacity, the mental energy and efficiency needed to bind experience together. When that happens, the system divides, and the parts remain insufficiently integrated.
A 2023 chapter by the theory’s authors summarizes the claim this way: trauma-related dissociation refers to the existence of at least two self-organizing subsystems, each with its own first-person perspective, within the personality as a whole. Dissociation is, first of all, a lowering of integrative capacity, and only secondarily a psychological defense. That is a significant shift in emphasis. It treats dissociation less as a clever escape and more as a structural failure of integration under extreme stress.
It helps to be clear about what the theory does not say. It does not say that a person has several separate people inside their head. It does not say that every dissociative experience is pathological; ordinary absorption, such as losing track of time while reading, is different. And it does not claim to have been proven in all its details.
Imagine Dara, 34, who grew up in a frightening home and now runs a successful bakery. On ordinary days she is cheerful and organized. When a customer raises his voice, she freezes, says nothing, and later cannot recall what the customer wanted. In the theory’s terms, a part geared to daily life and a part geared to defense are alternating, with too little communication between them.
The idea is easy to state and difficult to apply, which is why the rest of this article takes it in steps.
Where did the theory come from: Janet, Myers and the history of dissociation?
It grew from two older sources: the nineteenth-century work of Pierre Janet and the First World War observations of the British physician Charles Myers. Both described people who seemed to be split between a functioning self and a self stuck in trauma. The modern theory adds evolutionary psychobiology to these historical insights.
Pierre Janet, a French psychologist and physician working in the late 1800s, studied patients with what was then called hysteria. He argued that overwhelming experiences could leave memories and reactions “split off” from the rest of consciousness because the person lacked the mental strength to integrate them. In his 1907 lectures, The Major Symptoms of Hysteria, he described how such patients could show both lost functions and intrusive re-experiencing. His ideas about psychological automatism, the narrowing of consciousness and the importance of mental energy lay forgotten for much of the twentieth century and were revived in the 1980s and 1990s by Van der Hart and others.
The second source is Charles S. Myers, who worked with soldiers suffering from “shell shock” in the First World War and published Shell Shock in France 1914-18 in 1940. Myers observed that some soldiers seemed to alternate between a part that could function in daily life and a part that was fixed on the battlefield, and he named them the apparently normal personality and the emotional personality. A description of this pair is the basis for the central terminology of the modern theory.
The authors of TSDP built on these observations in three ways. First, they combined them with the idea of action systems: the apparently normal part is organized around systems for daily life, while the emotional part is organized around the defensive systems of fight, flight, freeze and submission. Second, they extended the model to a range of severities, from single-event trauma to chronic childhood abuse. Third, they connected it to modern research on trauma, attachment and neurobiology.
The historical roots matter for two reasons. They show that the clinical picture is not a recent invention or fad: clinicians in different eras and different wars, working independently, described similar alternations. And they remind us that dissociation research has had a stormy history, with periods of neglect and controversy. Some of the skepticism that surrounds dissociation today reflects that history.
Picture a field hospital in 1916. A young soldier, quiet and polite, follows instructions for days. One night a shell lands nearby and he is suddenly on the ground, shaking, unable to speak. By morning he is polite again and has no memory of the night. Myers saw the same man in two states, and he took them seriously.
Janet and Myers described the phenomenon. The modern theory tries to explain how it works.

What are the “apparently normal part” and the “emotional part”?
They are the two basic building blocks of the theory. The apparently normal part (ANP) is the part of the personality that manages daily life and tries to avoid trauma-related memories and feelings. The emotional part (EP) is the part that stays fixed on the traumatic experience and the defensive reactions it triggered. Together they make up the simplest form of structural dissociation.
The authors, notably Ellert R. S. Nijenhuis and Onno van der Hart, described the parts in terms of the evolutionary action systems they draw on. In their writings on the theory, the authors describe the ANP as organized around systems for daily life and the survival of the species, such as exploration, attachment, caregiving, energy management and play. The EP, by contrast, is organized around systems for defense, which include fight, flight, freeze and total submission, and sometimes around other systems such as sexuality or attachment cries that were active at the time of the trauma.
| Feature | Apparently normal part (ANP) | Emotional part (EP) |
|---|---|---|
| Main goal | Get through daily life, work, care for others | Detect and respond to threat; hold the trauma |
| Action systems | Exploration, attachment, caregiving, play | Defense: fight, flight, freeze, submission |
| Relation to trauma | Avoids or is detached from trauma memories | Fixed on the traumatic experience; re-experiences |
| Typical experience | Numbness, “functioning,” sense of normality | Fear, shame, rage, bodily alarm, flashbacks |
| Typical reaction to reminders | Avoidance, denial, distraction | Intense reactivity, hypervigilance |
Both parts are, in the theory, parts of one personality, not separate people. Each has some sense of self and a rudimentary first-person perspective, but they share much underlying content and function. The book’s reviewers describe the parts as self-conscious components of a whole, with each part more complex than a single psychobiological state.
The ANP is not “false” or “fake,” and the EP is not “bad.” The ANP’s avoidance is an adaptive attempt to keep life going, and the EP’s reactivity is an adaptive, though outdated, attempt to survive. The trouble is that they do not communicate well. The ANP may be unaware of the EP’s intensity, may find it frightening or shameful, and may be surprised by the EP’s reactions.
This approach also explains a pattern many survivors describe: they feel fine, and then they do not. They may find themselves flooded by fear at a harmless trigger, then flat and distant an hour later. In the theory, each state reflects a different part being “in front,” with the other part more or less out of awareness.
Think of Malik, 41, a teacher who is calm and funny in class but who, when a colleague touches his shoulder from behind, spins around white-faced and angry. A minute later he apologizes and cannot explain the reaction. His ANP runs his working life; an EP, shaped by childhood, reacts to the touch.
What are primary, secondary and tertiary structural dissociation?
They are three levels of complexity in how the personality divides, from simple to complex. The levels reflect the severity, duration and developmental timing of trauma, and they are the part of the theory that most directly links it to diagnoses. The distinction was laid out by Kathy Steele, Onno van der Hart and Ellert Nijenhuis in a series of papers and in The Haunted Self.
- Primary structural dissociation: one ANP and one EP. In the authors’ account, this level characterizes simple posttraumatic stress disorder and acute stress disorder, often after a single or limited trauma in adulthood. The person alternates between numbness and avoidance on the one hand and intrusive re-experiencing on the other.
- Secondary structural dissociation: one ANP and more than one EP. The authors link it to more complex trauma-related problems, such as complex PTSD and other specified dissociative disorder. Different EPs may carry different defensive responses, for example one fixed on fight and another on submission, or different memories.
- Tertiary structural dissociation: more than one ANP and more than one EP. In the theory, this level characterizes dissociative identity disorder (DID), where the division affects daily life itself, so that different parts may take charge in different settings.
A basic premise of the theory, as summarized in book reviews, is that all trauma-related disorders involve some degree of structural dissociation, with acute stress disorder and simple PTSD the most basic and DID the most complex. The more severe, early and prolonged the traumatization, the more likely a person is to show secondary or tertiary patterns, especially if the trauma occurred in the context of attachment relationships and during childhood, when the personality is still forming.
This framework offers an explanation for why people with similar histories can look so different. A soldier who experienced a single combat trauma may have a clear primary pattern; a survivor of years of childhood neglect and abuse may have a more complex one. It also explains why treatments that work for simple PTSD may be insufficient for those with complex dissociative presentations: the work first has to address the division itself.
Important cautions apply. The three levels are a model, not a measured classification. Real people do not sort neatly into three bins, and clinicians often describe a continuum. The correspondence between levels and diagnoses is approximate: not every person with complex PTSD has secondary dissociation of the kind described, and the criteria for counting parts are difficult to apply consistently.
Picture three composite patients. Nuno, 29, was in a serious car accident and now alternates between flat avoidance and sudden panic. Leila, 38, grew up in an unsafe home and has several recognizable states, including a frightened child-like state and a furious protective one. Sam, 45, has long gaps in memory and finds that different ways of living seem to take over in different places. Each illustrates, loosely, a different level.

Which symptoms does the theory explain?
It explains why trauma survivors can show both too much and too little: intrusions and flashbacks alongside numbness and amnesia. The theory sorts dissociative symptoms into two pairs of categories: positive versus negative, and psychoform versus somatoform. The categories are widely used in dissociation research and clinical assessment, and they provide a vocabulary for understanding what might otherwise seem a random jumble.
Negative symptoms are losses of function or of integration: amnesia, emotional numbing, loss of sensation or of movement. Positive symptoms are intrusions of something that should not be there: flashbacks, intrusive thoughts, voices, sudden emotions or physical sensations. Psychoform symptoms concern mental functions such as memory, thought and emotion. Somatoform symptoms concern the body, such as pain, numbness, paralysis or loss of the ability to speak.
Seen through the model, many puzzling experiences make sense:
- Flashbacks and nightmares: the EP intrudes into awareness, bringing sensory and emotional fragments of the traumatic event.
- Emotional numbing and “autopilot” functioning: the ANP is in front, avoiding trauma-related feelings and focused on getting through the day.
- Amnesia for events or periods: the ANP does not have access to what the EP experienced, and the reverse may also occur.
- Hearing internal voices: in the authors’ account, an ANP may hear an EP as a voice, which is different from psychotic hallucinations in origin, though careful assessment is needed.
- Sudden mood or behavior shifts: switches between parts in response to triggers can look like mood swings or personality changes.
- Unexplained physical symptoms: body sensations or functional losses may belong to a part and mirror defensive reactions at the time of trauma.
The model also clarifies a common point of confusion: the “switching” between states in everyday trauma survivors is rarely dramatic. It is more often subtle, a change in voice, posture, mood or knowledge, which may pass unnoticed by others. In popular media, dissociation is often portrayed as spectacular transformations; in clinical practice it is usually quiet and easily mistaken for moodiness, shyness or an unreliable memory.
A caution. Symptoms such as voices or memory gaps have many possible causes, including psychosis, epilepsy, substance effects, sleep deprivation and ordinary absent-mindedness. The theory offers one framework for trauma-related cases and does not replace a thorough clinical assessment.
Take Priyanka, 36, who finds herself on the wrong train line twice a month and cannot recall deciding to go there. She also has times when she is overcome by a terror she cannot explain. Her doctor first checks for medical and sleep causes. Only after ruling those out does the question of dissociation arise.
Why does structural dissociation persist? The role of phobias and integrative capacity
According to the theory, it persists because of a lowered integrative capacity and a set of learned avoidances that the authors call phobias. The authors argue that dissociation is not only a one-time reaction to trauma but is maintained over time by factors that keep the parts apart, and that therapy must address these maintaining factors.
The first factor is integrative capacity, the ability to bring experiences, feelings and actions together into a coherent whole. This capacity varies with age, genetic factors, health, sleep and stress, and it is reduced by chronic trauma, neglect and ongoing stress. When it is low, a person can manage simple integrations (“I went to work”) but may fail with complex ones (“I am a person who was hurt and who is now safe”). The authors described this using Janet’s concepts of mental energy and mental efficiency.
The second set of factors consists of the phobias. In The Haunted Self, the authors describe phobic avoidance of several things that keep dissociation in place: a phobia of traumatic memories, a phobia of dissociative parts (both ANPs fearing EPs and EPs fearing ANPs), a phobia of attachment and attachment loss, a phobia of mental actions that derive from trauma (such as feelings and bodily sensations), and a phobia of change and of normal life. Avoidance gives relief in the short term and keeps the division in place in the long term.
These ideas have practical implications. They explain, for example, why a survivor may fear the very therapy that could help, or why a person may feel anxious when life gets better. A calm day can feel unsafe when safety was never reliable. They also explain why forcing trauma memories too early can backfire: if the person does not have the integrative capacity to tolerate them, it can overwhelm the system and deepen the division.
As a theoretical framework, this part of the model is consistent with broader clinical and research knowledge that avoidance maintains anxiety and trauma symptoms. Its more specific claims about particular phobias and their role in dissociation have received less direct testing. The authors themselves have acknowledged that the theory needs further development and scientific scrutiny.
Imagine Gabriela, 42, who makes real progress in therapy and then abruptly cancels three sessions. When she returns, she says that feeling better frightened her. In the theory, this is not resistance or failure. It is the phobia of change, and it can be talked about and worked with.
The key practical idea is that integration is built, step by step, by raising capacity and lowering fear, not by confrontation.

What does brain research say about the theory?
It offers partial, preliminary support, mostly from small studies of people with dissociative identity disorder. The most cited work comes from a Dutch-led team that included Nijenhuis, and it asks whether the different “parts” show different physiological and brain responses to the same trauma-related material.
Neuroscientist Antoinette A. T. S. Reinders and colleagues published a symptom-provocation study in 2006 in Biological Psychiatry. They examined patients with DID who could shift between a neutral identity state, which handled daily life, and a trauma-related identity state. Participants listened to scripts about their own traumatic memories while the team measured subjective ratings, cardiovascular responses (heart rate, blood pressure and heart rate variability) and regional cerebral blood flow with positron emission tomography. The researchers reported that the two states differed in their psychobiological responses to the trauma script: the trauma-related state showed stronger cardiovascular and brain reactions of the kind associated with defense, while the neutral state responded differently. The findings were interpreted as compatible with the theory’s claim that distinct psychobiological subsystems exist.
That is interesting, but there are important limits. The sample was very small, with only a handful of participants in a specialized clinical group. The study had no matched control group of healthy actors asked to simulate states, which limits what can be concluded about whether the differences reflect true dissociation or other factors. Later studies tried to address this, with mixed results, and some researchers question whether brain-imaging differences between states can show the existence of separate “parts” at all. Brain activity differs between any two emotional states in anyone.
Other evidence is indirect. Research on PTSD has identified different neural responses in people who re-experience trauma versus those who respond with detachment, which fits the broader outline of the theory’s two clusters (intrusion and avoidance), though not its specific claims about parts. Research on early adversity, attachment and the neurobiology of stress supports the general idea that severe early trauma can disrupt the integration of experience.
It is fair to say that the theory is supported more by clinical observation and by consistency with historical and psychobiological findings than by definitive experimental tests. Its authors themselves said as much, noting that controlled validation of the treatment based on the theory had yet to begin.
Consider a thought experiment. If you measured your own heart rate while remembering a happy day and then a frightening one, you would see differences. Showing that two states differ is easy. Showing that they reflect different parts of a personality, as the theory claims, is much harder.
How does the theory relate to PTSD and its dissociative subtype?
It treats PTSD itself as a form of structural dissociation, and it overlaps with the idea of a dissociative subtype of PTSD, though the two are not the same. The overlap helps explain why some people with PTSD feel flooded and others feel numb.
Psychiatrist Ruth A. Lanius and colleagues published a widely cited paper in 2010 in the American Journal of Psychiatry titled “Emotion modulation in PTSD: Clinical and neurobiological evidence for a dissociative subtype.” They proposed that people with PTSD can respond to trauma reminders in two ways: with under-modulation of emotion, meaning hyperarousal and re-experiencing, or with over-modulation, meaning emotional detachment, depersonalization and derealization. A substantial minority of patients show the second pattern, and brain imaging suggested that the two groups differ in how prefrontal and limbic regions respond. The DSM-5 added a “with dissociative symptoms” specifier to PTSD in 2013, reflecting this research.
The dissociative subtype and structural dissociation theory are compatible. Both recognize that trauma responses include a mixture of intrusion and detachment. Both link the detached pattern to avoidance and to different brain activity. But they differ in emphasis and level of explanation. The subtype concept is descriptive and diagnostic: it asks which patients have prominent depersonalization and derealization. The structural dissociation theory is explanatory and broad: it claims that all trauma-related disorders involve some degree of division of the personality, and it describes the parts and their action systems.
This difference matters in practice. A clinician who uses the subtype concept may focus on assessing depersonalization and adapting trauma therapy accordingly. A clinician who uses structural dissociation theory may focus on mapping the parts, building communication between them and sequencing treatment. Neither approach has been shown to be clearly superior in controlled trials, and many clinicians combine ideas from several frameworks.
The wider diagnostic picture is crowded. The diagnostic manuals describe depersonalization-derealization disorder, dissociative amnesia, dissociative identity disorder, other specified dissociative disorder, complex PTSD (in the International Classification of Diseases) and others. The theory offers a unifying story, but diagnostic categories rely on symptom criteria, not on counting parts.
It is worth noting that dissociation is not unique to trauma. People with no trauma history sometimes experience depersonalization, especially during anxiety, sleep deprivation or substance use. TSDP applies specifically to trauma-related dissociation, which its authors distinguish from other alterations in consciousness.
Picture Noor, 27, who after an assault feels as if she is watching her life through glass. She is not reliving the event; she is absent from it, and from much else. A clinician using the dissociative subtype concept would call this over-modulation. A clinician using structural dissociation would call it an ANP at work. Both would take her seriously.

How does the theory shape treatment?
It supports a phase-oriented approach that builds safety and the capacity to integrate before confronting traumatic memories, and then works on integration and rehabilitation. This structure is not unique to the theory; it follows a consensus among trauma specialists, but the theory gives it a specific rationale.
Psychiatrist Judith L. Herman described the three-stage model in her 1992 book Trauma and Recovery: establishing safety, remembrance and mourning, and reconnection with ordinary life. The treatment guidelines for dissociative disorders from the International Society for the Study of Trauma and Dissociation use a similar approach. The authors of TSDP adapted it with the concepts of structural dissociation and action systems.
- Phase 1: stabilization, symptom reduction and safety. The focus is on building skills for managing symptoms, regulating arousal, developing a reliable relationship with the therapist and increasing communication and cooperation among parts. In the authors’ model this phase may also involve overcoming the phobias of attachment, of trauma-derived mental actions and of dissociative parts.
- Phase 2: treatment of traumatic memories. When the person is stable enough, the work addresses the traumatic memories in a paced and controlled way, with the aim of integrating them as past events, using approaches that may include trauma-focused therapies adapted for dissociation.
- Phase 3: integration and rehabilitation. Treatment helps the person build a more cohesive sense of self, develop relationships and take on the demands and pleasures of ordinary life, including overcoming the phobia of normal life.
The book Treating Trauma-Related Dissociation, by Kathy Steele, Suzette Boon and Onno van der Hart (2017), gave clinicians a practical guide to this approach. It stresses pacing, collaboration, working with the “whole person” and avoiding re-traumatization. In practice, this might involve grounding techniques, building internal communication (for example, helping parts acknowledge each other), psychoeducation, and gradually working on specific memories.
Important limits apply. Randomized controlled trials of the full phase-oriented treatment for dissociative disorders are scarce, and the authors acknowledged that controlled validation of treatment based on the theory was still to begin. Evidence from smaller, naturalistic studies suggests that treatment can reduce symptoms, but it is not the same as controlled proof. People with dissociative symptoms should look for a clinician trained specifically in trauma and dissociation, and be wary of anyone who rushes into memory work or insists on a particular approach.
Several practical points for readers. Dissociation treatment usually takes time, often years for complex presentations. Stabilization is not a waiting room; it is a central part of the work. Medication may help with associated depression, anxiety or sleep problems, though it does not treat dissociation itself. And safety is a priority: if you ever feel at risk of harming yourself, contact local emergency services or a crisis line.
Imagine Tobias, 52, who spent his first six months of therapy learning grounding skills and how to notice when he was slipping out of the present. He was impatient. Looking back, he says that was the part that made the rest possible.
What are the criticisms and limits of the theory?
The theory is influential but not universally accepted, and honest readers should know its weaknesses. Critics and even the authors raise several points. In summary: it is a theoretical model whose specific claims about parts, levels and phobias have only partial empirical support, and it sits within a field that remains divided on the nature of dissociation.
- Limited experimental validation: the authors acknowledged that the theory needs further development and scientific scrutiny. Neuroimaging and psychophysiological studies are small and open to alternative interpretations.
- The parts language can mislead: describing “parts” or “personalities” can suggest separate people, even though the theory regards them as components of one system. Some critics argue that the language risks reifying fluid states.
- Oversimplification: the ANP/EP split and the three levels may not capture the variety of real dissociative experience, and the correspondence with diagnoses is approximate.
- Alternative accounts: other researchers emphasize sociocognitive factors such as suggestibility, fantasy proneness and the influence of therapy and media on how dissociative symptoms are expressed, while others emphasize different developmental and attachment models.
The debate over dissociative identity disorder illustrates the stakes. Psychiatrist Martin J. Dorahy and colleagues reviewed the empirical literature in a 2014 paper in the Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry and concluded that evidence supports DID as a valid and treatable condition associated with trauma, with identifiable clinical features and neurobiological correlates, while acknowledging that research gaps remain. Skeptics counter that some of the evidence is weak and that iatrogenic influences are possible. The weight of current research favors the view that trauma-related dissociation is real, but the exact mechanisms are disputed.
What the theory does not do is also worth stating. It does not prove that all trauma produces a division of the personality; many people exposed to trauma never develop dissociative symptoms and show resilience. It does not claim that every memory gap is a sign of parts. And it does not replace careful assessment of other conditions that can look similar, including psychosis, epilepsy, bipolar disorder and substance effects.
For people living with these symptoms, the most useful stance may be pragmatic. Theories are maps. They are valuable when they help people understand themselves and find effective help, and they should be revised when evidence demands it. If this framework helps you make sense of your experience, you can use it as a starting point for conversation with a trained clinician. If it does not, other frameworks may fit better.
If you recognize aspects of this article in your own life, such as gaps in memory, feeling detached from your body or sudden changes in state, consider speaking with a primary care doctor, psychologist or psychiatrist who has experience with trauma. Early, careful assessment helps. If you are in distress or at risk, contact local emergency services or a crisis line.
FAQs about the Theory of Structural Dissociation
What is the theory of structural dissociation of the personality?
It is a model developed by Onno van der Hart, Ellert Nijenhuis and Kathy Steele, most fully described in their 2006 book The Haunted Self. It proposes that severe trauma, particularly early and repeated trauma, can overwhelm the person’s ability to integrate experience, so that the personality divides into parts: apparently normal parts that handle daily life and emotional parts that remain fixed on the trauma and on defensive reactions. The parts are components of one person, not separate people. The theory aims to explain the mix of intrusion and numbness seen in trauma survivors.
What are an apparently normal part and an emotional part?
The apparently normal part, or ANP, is the part of the personality that gets on with daily life, such as work, caring for others and routine, and tends to avoid trauma-related memories and feelings. The emotional part, or EP, is the part that remains fixed on the traumatic experience and on defensive responses such as fight, flight, freeze or submission. The terms come from the work of Charles Myers, who described soldiers with shell shock in the First World War. The modern theory links them to inborn action systems.
What do primary, secondary and tertiary structural dissociation mean?
They are three levels of complexity. Primary structural dissociation involves one apparently normal part and one emotional part and is linked in the theory to simple posttraumatic stress disorder and acute stress disorder. Secondary involves one apparently normal part and several emotional parts and is linked to more complex trauma-related problems such as complex PTSD. Tertiary involves several of both and is linked to dissociative identity disorder. The levels are a model, not a precise classification, and real people often fall between categories.
Does the theory mean people have multiple personalities?
No, not in the popular sense. The theory regards the parts as components of one personality system, each with some sense of self and a first-person perspective, but sharing much underlying content and function. Only in the most complex form, tertiary dissociation associated with dissociative identity disorder, are the divisions pronounced enough to affect daily life across different settings. Even then, clinicians view the parts as aspects of one person who needs help to integrate and communicate between them, not as separate individuals.
Is the theory proven?
Not fully. It is supported by historical observation, clinical experience and some psychophysiological and neuroimaging studies, such as a 2006 study of patients with dissociative identity disorder that found different responses in different identity states. But these studies were small, and the authors themselves have said that the theory needs further development and scientific scrutiny, and that controlled validation of the treatment had yet to begin. Critics also argue that some claims are oversimplified. It is best viewed as an influential framework, not a settled fact.
How is structural dissociation treated?
Treatment typically follows a phase-oriented approach: first building safety, stabilization and skills for managing symptoms and improving communication between parts, then processing traumatic memories at a careful pace, and finally integrating and rebuilding life. The approach follows the three-stage model described by Judith Herman and adapted by the theory’s authors. It usually takes time, often years for complex presentations, and is best delivered by a clinician with specific training in trauma and dissociation. Rushing into memory work too early can overwhelm the person.
How is it different from the dissociative subtype of PTSD?
The dissociative subtype is a descriptive diagnostic concept, added to the DSM-5 as a specifier for PTSD with prominent depersonalization or derealization, based on research by Ruth Lanius and colleagues showing that some people respond to trauma reminders with emotional over-modulation and detachment. Structural dissociation theory is a broader explanatory model that views all trauma-related disorders as involving some division of the personality. They are compatible but operate at different levels, and neither has been shown to be superior as a guide to treatment.
When should someone seek help for dissociative symptoms?
Seek an assessment if you experience frequent gaps in memory, feeling detached from your body or surroundings, finding yourself in places without knowing how you got there, sudden unexplained shifts in mood or behavior, or hearing internal voices, especially if you have a history of trauma. These symptoms have many possible causes, so a doctor may first check for medical, sleep or substance-related explanations. A psychologist or psychiatrist experienced in trauma can then assess further. If you feel unsafe, contact local emergency services or a crisis line.
Bibliography
- Dorahy, M. J., Brand, B. L., Şar, V., Krüger, C., Stavropoulos, P., Martínez-Taboas, A., Lewis-Fernández, R., & Middleton, W. (2014). Dissociative identity disorder: An empirical overview. Australian & New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 48(5), 402-417.
- Herman, J. L. (1992). Trauma and recovery. Basic Books.
- Janet, P. (1907). The major symptoms of hysteria. Macmillan.
- Lanius, R. A., Vermetten, E., Loewenstein, R. J., Brand, B., Schmahl, C., Bremner, J. D., & Spiegel, D. (2010). Emotion modulation in PTSD: Clinical and neurobiological evidence for a dissociative subtype. American Journal of Psychiatry, 167(6), 640-647.
- Myers, C. S. (1940). Shell shock in France 1914-18. Cambridge University Press.
- Reinders, A. A. T. S., Nijenhuis, E. R. S., Quak, J., Korf, J., Haaksma, J., Paans, A. M. J., Willemsen, A. T. M., & den Boer, J. A. (2006). Psychobiological characteristics of dissociative identity disorder: A symptom provocation study. Biological Psychiatry, 60(7), 730-740.
- Steele, K., Boon, S., & van der Hart, O. (2017). Treating trauma-related dissociation: A practical, integrative approach. W. W. Norton.
- van der Hart, O., Nijenhuis, E. R. S., & Steele, K. (2006). The haunted self: Structural dissociation and the treatment of chronic traumatization. W. W. Norton.
Use this citation format to reference the article clearly and help readers find the original source.
PsychologyFor. (2026). Van Der Hart’s Theory of Structural Dissociation: What it is and What it Explains. PsychologyFor. https://psychologyfor.com/van-der-harts-theory-of-structural-dissociation-what-it-is-and-what-it-explains/