The Dyadic Theory Of Morals: The Keys To This Kurt Gray Model
Morality is a concept that has been studied for thousands of years, mainly through philosophy and more recently through psychology.
To this day, models continue to be proposed that try to explain this complex model in the most efficient way. It is precisely the objective of the dyadic theory of morality, which will be the central element of this article. We will try to shed light on this model in the following lines.
The dyadic theory of morality is a model that tries to explain the functioning of morality from a very particular perspective. Although several authors have been involved in its development, it is generally attributed to social psychologists Chelsea Schein and Kurt Gray.
His approach is based on the existence of two fundamental elements for the perception of any transgression of morality, that is, a dyad This is the reason why this model has been called the dyadic theory of morality. The minds of human beings would use a kind of scheme to measure morality, based on these two elements.
What are those two key pieces? That of the moral agent and that of the moral patient. The moral agent would be the one who carries out the action whose morality is in question It is the person, group, organization or any other entity that perpetrates the immoral action, and also does so intentionally, according to our perception.
But Before a moral agent there is always, necessarily, according to the dyadic theory of morality, a moral patient In other words, if someone commits an immoral act, someone is being a victim of said action and therefore suffering its effects. That would be the moral patient, the person or group that is suffering the aggression of the other component of the dyad.
Morality Quadrant
Starting from this basis, we could establish a quadrant, placing each of these dimensions on separate axes, and thus be able to classify people or groups based on whether they only have a predisposition to act as agents, that is, they have a high capacity for action. , or they tend to be patient, since their characteristics make them prone to suffering.
There are two other options: that said entity scores high in both variables, so it could act but also suffer, according to the dyadic theory of morality, and the fourth option, which would consist of a low predisposition to be any of the two options, that is, neither act nor suffer.
The first case, that of having an absolute capacity to act but none to suffer, is reserved only for very powerful entities, such as a large corporation. If it can only suffer consequences but not generate them, we would be talking about a being like a child or a defenseless animal.
The average human being, on the other hand, is situated at the third level, that of being able to both act and suffer. Finally, the fourth option that the dyadic theory of morality provides us would be to not have either of the two capacities, and for this we would have to refer only to inert beings.
These categories are interesting, because there is a correlation between them and other elements, such as rights and obligations, both at a legal and moral level, which is the topic at hand. Along these lines, it is observed that if a person or entity has a greater capacity to act than to suffer, he would have more obligations than rights.
On the contrary, that subject or group that is more patient than moral agent will see more rights than responsibilities in their favor. In other words, those in the first category are assigned a moral responsibility, while those in the second category are presupposed with moral rights.
What happens when the dyad is incomplete?
We saw at the beginning that the dyadic theory of morality implies the existence in all cases, according to the mental scheme that we use, of two fundamental elements to consider any moral transgression: that of the one who exercises it and that of the one who suffers it. But what happens when only one of the two is present?
In that case, we tend to fall into the presumption of the other element. That is, the human being seems to have a certain predisposition to assign the role of the non-present element to one that fits into our schemes, in order to complete the model of the dyadic theory of morality. As we will see below, this mechanism works in two directions.
Firstly, we may be faced with a situation in which we observe a moral agent, that is, someone or something that is carrying out a certain action that we could classify as immoral, according to our values ​​or ideals. Even if there is no one present who is acting as a moral patient, inevitably, we will tend to assign that category and thus complete the dyad
In this way, we will assume that, if someone is transgressing morality in some way, it is evident that someone is being a victim of this fact and therefore suffering its consequences, although objectively it does not have to be that way. It is an automatic issue, it happens without us being able to avoid it.
But we already saw that it is not the only way in which this mechanism can work. The other way occurs when we find someone who is suffering some type of suffering. In that case, the dyadic theory of morality also makes us tend to complete the dyad, but in the other sense.
That is to say, What an observer would automatically do is assume that, since there is a moral patient, there must be a moral agent who is the cause of the suffering of that person or group Even for events as foreign to morality as natural disasters (hurricanes, earthquakes, etc.), by causing suffering in many people, there will be those who attribute the authorship to entities such as God or nature itself.
Cataloging on a moral level
Another issue that the dyadic theory of morality highlights is what the authors call moral pigeonholing. This phenomenon refers to the tendency that human beings have to give the category to another person or group, either as an agent or as a moral patient.
The thing is, When classifying a subject, for example as a moral agent, what is being done at the same time, and automatically, is denying him the status of moral patient since the observers move in extremes.
Therefore, when considering that a person is a transgressor of a moral norm, they will be pigeonholed in that condition and it will be very difficult for us to consider at some point that they may be a moral patient, that is, that they may be the victim of another, different moral actor.
The mechanism is bidirectional, so exactly the same thing happens with those groups or individuals who have been moral patients In that case, they will have the status of victims, and we will not consider that they can be actors in transgressions of the norm, since we will see them only as patients and never as agents.
If we delve deeper into this question, we can realize the consequences of this approach made by the dyadic theory of morality. And the thing is that, on many occasions, we run the risk of stigmatizing people, groups or organizations, due to a specific fact, by which they will become potential moral transgressors with every action they take.
On the contrary, the opposite phenomenon can also occur, which is that an entity that at a certain moment has suffered morally because of others, can retain that category and in some way mitigate or exempt any possible moral agency that it commits towards others in the future
This appreciation is of great relevance and can help us be more aware of the moral judgments that we constantly make towards people and groups, considering them actors or victims, depending on the cataloging that we have made about them in the beginning.
But reality may be very different, and we may not be realizing that, in general, neither moral actors are always actors, nor are moral patients always patients. On the contrary, The normal thing is that every person is, sometimes an agent and sometimes a patient, without necessarily having the same condition at all times
As we can see, the dyadic theory of morality serves, among other things, so that we are aware of this important phenomenon, and we can take it into account to adopt a more objective position regarding morality.
